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C ONFLICT of laws involves primarily the areas of judicial jurisdiction,
choice of law, and judgments. During this survey period Texas case
law reflects a continuing state of flux as to judicial jurisdiction, a major but
expected choice of law development, and much activity with little substan-
tive change in the judgments' area.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Voluntary Self-Restraint. "The Act of State Doctrine is a judicially created
doctrine of restraint,"' said the Supreme Court of Texas in upholding a
court of civil appeals decision in Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co.2
Nelson Bunker Hunt discovered and produced oil in Libya pursuant to a
Libyan exploration and exploitation concession. Subsequently, Libya na-
tionalized all Hunt's oil interests covered by the concession agreement;
Hunt published notice worldwide of its claimed interests in Libyan oil
(based on the characterization of Libya's conduct as being in violation of
international law) and threatened suit against any purchasers of the oil.
Coastal States bought Libyan oil, which prompted Hunt to bring suit.
The majority of the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the act of state
doctrine prevented an exercise of jurisdiction by the district court of Texas
of Hunt's claim unless the case "comes within the exception to the Act of
State Doctrine created by the Hickenlooper Amendment."' 3 According to
the majority, recovery predicated upon the Hickenlooper Amendment4
must involve a claim of title or other right to property. After reviewing
Hunt's concession agreement, it was concluded that Hunt obtained only a
* A.B., J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., New York University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, Baylor University.
1. Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. 1979).
2. 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), afl'd, 583 S.W.2d 322
(Tex. 1979). See Newton, Conlict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 425,
425-28 (1979).
3. 583 S.W.2d at 324.
4. See id. at 324-25. Originally the title the "Hickenlooper Amendment" was applied
to § 2370(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-565, pt. III, § 301(d), 76
Stat. 260. In 1964 after the Supreme Court decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), § 2370(e) was amended by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,
§ 2370(e), Pub. L. No. 88-633, pt. III, § 301(d)-(g), 78 Stat. 1013. This provision, as currently
enacted, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976), is often referred to as the Sabbatino Amendment or
as the Hickenlooper Amendment.
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contractual right.' Thus, Hunt was denied recovery.
The dissent believed that the Hickenlooper Amendment was applicable
and that jurisdiction should be exercised as to Hunt's claim.6 After a brief
review of the development and current status of the act of state doctrine,
the dissent noted that "[tihe Hickenlooper Amendment was enacted in re-
action to Sabbaino and was meant to overrule, in part, that decision." 7
The question then became one of whether, under the facts of this case, the
Sabbatino8 case or the Hickenlooper Amendment applied. According to
the dissent, a court must determine the merits of a controversy if
(1) any party makes a claim of title or other right to property based
upon or traced through a confiscation or taking, (2) the President has
not filed with the court a suggestion that the application of the act of
state doctrine is required by the foreign policy interests of the United
States, and (3) that taking was by a foreign state in violation of the
principles of international law.9
In the majority view the Hickenlooper Amendment is triggered only if
Hunt has a property right in oil, not a contractual right. The dissent, how-
ever, found that both the language of the statute and its legislative history
indicate that the facts of this case fall squarely within "a claim of title or
other right to property."'" Thus, after determining that the remainder of
the test was also satisfied," the dissent would have heard Hunt's claim.
The problem presented here involves much more than a mere question
of statutory interpretation. Indeed, there are statutory provisions designed
5. 583 S.W.2d at 325. The majority declared that Libyan law controled, but never set
forth the contents of such law.
6. Id at 326-37. Justice Steakley wrote the dissent joined by Chief Justice Greenhill
and Justice Spears.
7. Id at 327.
8. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
9. 583 S.W.2d at 330 (footnote omitted). The majority phrased the necessary qualifica-
tions differently: "1. Expropriated property must come within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. 2. The act of the expropriating nation must be in violation of interna-
tional law. 3. The asserted claim must be a claim of title or other right to property." Id at
325 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1976)). Section 2370(e) actually reads:
[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the princi-
ples of international law in a case in which a claim or title or other right to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state. . . based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or other taking . . . by an act of that state in
violation of the principles of international law.
(Emphasis added.)
10. 583 S.W.2d at 330. The dissent relied upon testimony presented to the House com-
mittees considering the amendment by Louis Henkin, Columbia University Professor of In-
ternational Law, Cecil J. Olmstead, Professor of International Law at the New York
University School of Law, and Congressman Adair, sponsor of the original amendment in
the House. Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Hearings on HR. 7750 Before the House Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st sess., pt. VII, 1076 (1965).
I1. Since the Department of State supports Hunt's claim in this case, there is no real
doubt about the President's filing with the court a suggestion that the application of the act
of state doctrine is required by the foreign policy interests of the United States. And al-
though it is admitted that there is some question whether or not there exists a violation of the
principles of international law, under the facts of this case a violation was found to exist.
583 S.W.2d at 334-37, 335 n.12.
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to reverse Sabbatino;12 the question is whether or not those provisions are
constitutional. In Sabbatino the Supreme Court described the act of state
doctrine as having "constitutional underpinnings."' 3 At the heart of that
constitutional connection is the doctrine of separation of powers, which is
responsive to the traditional roles of the Executive, Congress, and the Judi-
ciary in the area of foreign affairs. Not only is there a question of interfer-
ence with the roles of other branches, a role that cannot, in theory, be
waived by another branch,'4 but there is also a question of whether the
courts are truly suited to handle the kind of dispute presented in cases like
Hunt. 1 Obviously, definitions in these areas are difficult and will con-
tinue to be so until the Supreme Court provides a precise definition and
fixes the constitutional status of such definition.
Further, because Middle East oil discovered and produced by Texans
now appears to be the product most likely to be "expropriated," we can
expect to see much continued litigation in this area. An excellent example,
although not involving Middle East oil, is Industrial Investment Develop-
ment Corp. v. Mitsui& Co. ,16 in which the Fifth Circuit was faced with the
question of whether the act of state doctrine precluded the plaintiffs anti-
trust action. Industrial Investment, the plaintiff, decided to enter the log-
ging and lumber products business in Indonesia. Indonesia had enacted a
plan for encouraging and regulating foreign private capital investment,
which mandated that such investment develop Indonesian manpower and
provide opportunities for Indonesian co-ownership. Any foreign private
investment involving logging also had to comply with land use regulations.
Industrial Investment sought to comply with these Indonesian require-
ments but ultimately failed, allegedly because the defendant, Mitsui, a
Japanese corporation, and its American subsidiary infiltrated the plaintiffs
operation in Indonesia for the purpose of destroying plaintiffs logging
business. As noted by the majority opinion, "[tihe complaint intricately
details a plot, spawned from a 1972 increase in the price of timber, in
which the Mitsui companies" 1 7 sought to eliminate the plaintiffs as poten-
tial competitors and thereafter protect their competitive edge.' 8 The dis-
trict court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976).
13. 376 U.S. at 423.
14. Attempted use of an executive waiver generated the so-called Bernstein exception.
See Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). In First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Blackmun rejected the Bernstein exception because the validity of a foreign
act of state is a "political question not cognizable in our courts." Id at 787-88. Justice
Powell also disapproved of the Bernstein exception since he "would be uncomfortable with a
doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive the Executive's permission before in-
voking its jurisdiction." Id at 773.
15. This is often referred to by the courts as a question of whether the issue is presented
in a form "traditionally regarded as being subject to resolution by a court." See generally
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979).
17. Id at 50.
18. The plaintiffs also asserted violations of §§ 1, 2, and 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15
U.S.C. § 8 (1976).
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ground that the act of state doctrine prevented judicial review of the fed-
eral claims.'9
On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court was concerned not
about legislative attempts to overrule the act of state doctrine2" but about
the nature and applicability of the doctrine itself. Although the constitu-
tional nature of the doctrine was not critical to the resolution of the ques-
tion formulated, there were constitutional underpinnings. As such the
doctrine was seen as a separation of powers question in which the proper
distribution depended upon the ramifications of judicial intervention into
executive conduct of international relations including those ramificiations
that might arise out of inconsistent judicial and executive behavior. From
this position the majority viewed recent Supreme Court statements on the
act of state doctrine as attempts to determine the proper balance in given
cases. The opinion tacitly admitted, however, that more was involved than
a mere question of proper balancing; there was a very real question as to
what elements are to be properly considered in the balancing.2 Nonethe-
less the majority opinion addressed only the issue of balancing and con-
cluded that foreign governmental involvement does not automatically
protect anti-competitive conduct illegal in this country from scrutiny by
American courts.22 In the view of the majority, the complaint charges par-
ties subject to the court's authority with conduct that violates United States
law, the determination of which did not necessitate a resolution of the pro-
priety of Indonesia's failure to issue a logging license. Rather it was
enough that the plaintiffs offer proof to show that the defendants conspired
to cause plaintiffs' potential exploitation of an Indonesian concession to
"die aborning. '23 Of course, the question of whether the Indonesian Gov-
ernment would have issued a cutting license was relevant to the issue of
the value of the destroyed venture. In the majority view, however, the
legitimate goal of insuring competition outweighed any minor embarrass-
ment to the executive department resulting from an incidental examination
of the actions of a foreign government in connection with a determination
of damages. 24 Finally, it was noted that antitrust control would be largely
thwarted if mere inclusion of some foreign governmental act in an an-
ticompetitive scheme is enough to invoke the act of state doctrine. 25 The
19. 594 F.2d at 49.
20. In fact the majority asserts, "Although Sabbatino's bar against claims based on the
asserted invalidity of Cuban confiscations has been legislatively overruled by the 'Hick-
enlooper Amendment,' . . . the case is still the leading authority on the act of state doc-
trine." Id at 51 n.7.
21. For instance, the broad "commercial act" exception to the act of state doctrine was
not supported by a majority of the Supreme Court. The Second Circuit, however, at least in
a dictum, has treated a commercial exception as firmly established. Id at 52 n.9.
22. Id at 52.
23. Id at 54.
24. Id at 53 (citing Continental One Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690 (1962); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)).
25. See 594 F.2d at 54-55, where language in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977), is criticized in this connection. See also Note, Sher-
man Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1247 (1977);
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dissent reasoned, however, that since the damage complained of stemmed
directly from the denial by Indonesia of a concession to cut timber in Indo-
nesia, the act of state doctrine was held to require a dismissal.26 Given
that open questions exist as to the exact basis for the act of state doctrine
and its status as a constitutional rule, disagreements seem inevitable.
B. Jurisdiction of the Person
The Constitutional Question. Recent decisions by the Supreme Court of
the United States setting forth the mandates of substantive due process as
to the exercise of jurisdiction27 have generated questions as to the exact
requirements of due process and the application of these requirements in
individual cases. Last year the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of
whether or not an Idaho official charged by Idaho law with regulating a
takeover of an Idaho-based corporation by a Texas corporation could con-
stitutionally be subjected to jurisdiction in a Texas court.28
Great Western, a Texas corporation, made a tender offer to take over a
publicly owned Idaho corporation, Sunshine Mining and Metal Company.
Under Idaho law, Great Western was required to satisfy certain statutory
provisions designed to protect investors.29 Following an unsuccessful at-
tempt by Great Western to comply with Idaho law, Great Western filed
suit in federal district court. Two Idaho officials appeared, specially con-
testing, among other things, jurisdiction. A divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found as one basis for assertion of jurisdic-
tion the Texas long-arm statute30 that was held constitutional when ap-
plied to the facts.3
The due process clause prohibits any exercise of jurisdiction that offends
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, which in turn relates
to the sufficiency of contacts among the forum state, the defendant, and the
litigation. Whether the contacts are sufficient is difficult to determine. Jus-
tices of the United States Supreme Court disagree as to the exact meaning
and application of the due process jurisdictional formula. 32 Disagreement
also existed at the court of appeals level as to whether the "effects" of
activity in Idaho on a Texas corporation were sufficient to satisfy constitu-
tional mandates so as to allow a Texas court to exercise jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court considered this point on appeal.33
Note, The Act of State Doctrine- Anti-Trust Conspiracies to Induce Foreign Sovereign Acts,
10 INT'L LAW & POL. 495 (1978).
26. 594 F.2d at 56.
27. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
28. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom.
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710, 61 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1979).
29. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501-13 (Supp. 1977).
30. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1963).
31. See Newton, supra note 2, at 439-43, for a further discussion of the Fifth Circuit
decision.
32. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). See also discussion in Lee-Hy
Paving v. O'Connor, 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), a fd, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
33. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710, 61 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1979).
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The major issue in this case, whether the district court had personal ju-
risdiction over the defendants, is important on its own and becomes even
more significant when considered in conjunction with the Supreme Court's
recent holding that a state may not automatically claim immunity from
suit in the courts of another state.34 Presently, however, no definite answer
is possible because the Supreme Court avoided the issue in Great Western
by reversing the normal order of considering personal jurisdiction and
venue and holding that venue was improper. The majority view notes that
"neither personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in
the sense that subject matter jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges
of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures on the court, and both
may be waived by the parties."35 It is therefore possible, where sound pru-
dential justification exists, 36 to reverse the normal order of considering per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue. The sound prudential justification offered by
the Court for reversing the normal order was the difficult and previously
undecided question of whether an exercise of jurisdiction under the Texas
long-arm statute in this case was constitutional.37 Since the majority
found it clear that venue was improper the question was not reached.
Assertion of Jurisdiction. During the survey period there were many other
cases dealing with assertion ofjurisdiction. The most important are briefly
discussed below. In Motiograph, Inc. v. Check-Out Systems, Inc. 38 the
Texas plaintiff advertised in a national magazine. The defendant, a South
Carolina corporation, wrote a letter to Texas inquiring about becoming a
dealer in South Carolina of the equipment being manufactured in Texas.
The plaintiff was not interested but did send the South Carolina corpora-
tion some literature. The next year the defendant, after again seeing the
plaintiff's advertisement in a national trade magazine, made the same in-
quiry. This time several telephone calls ensued, and the plaintiff sent a
representative to South Carolina. Later, the plaintiffs equipment was
demonstrated to the defendant at a national trade meeting in Chicago. Al-
though a dealer contract was never executed, the defendant represented
the plaintiff in South Carolina. As a result, the defendant sent two em-
ployees to Texas for one week of training, purchased equipment, mailed in
two payments, sent a third employee to Texas, and received employees of
the plaintiff to install the purchased equipment and to try to solve
problems that developed. Unhappily the problems were not resolved, and
34. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
35. 99 S. Ct. at 2715, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 472, (citing Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
346 U.S. 338 (1953); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939)).
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2715, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 472.
37. In oral arguments the attorney for Great Western was questioned as to whether the
alleged jurisdictional acts fell within the ambit of statutory authorization. 47 U.S.L.W. 3693,
3693-95 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1979). In Leroy the majority indicated at footnote II some doubt on
this issue although the district court and court of appeals had concluded that statutory au-
thorization existed. 99 S. Ct. at 2715, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 472. See Newton, supra note 2, at 439.
In keeping with its general practice the Supreme Court did not reexamine the state-law
determination. The dissent did not directly consider the question of due process.
38. 573 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd).
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the defendant ceased payment. These facts constituted sufficient contacts
to allow the defendant to be sued in Texas consistent with traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.39
In Computer Synergy Corp. v. Business Systems Products, Inc. '0 the trial
court granted the special appearance of a California corporation and dis-
missed the suit for want of jurisdiction. In 1977 Richard J. Feely negoti-
ated a dealer agreement with Business Systems Products, whose principal
place of business was California. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement
consummated in California, Feely and his Texas corporation, Computer
Synergy Corporation, were granted exclusive sales territories in Houston
and Dallas-Fort Worth. Initially the agreement seemed to work well: the
California corporation shipped goods to the Texas corporation F.O.B. Cal-
ifornia; payments were made by the California corporation to the Texas
corporation; and they communicated by mail and telephone. Problems
arose when the Texas corporation contracted with a second Texas corpora-
tion granting a right to sell in Texas. The second Texas corporation made
a sale in which a down payment was made but goods were never delivered.
The two Texas corporations terminated their contract by mutual agree-
ment. At this point the Texas purchaser went to California to investigate.
The Texas purchaser ultimately cancelled the sale and the first Texas cor-
poration sued the California corporation, seeking damages for interference
with an existing contract and seeking injunctive relief.
On appeal the California corporation had the burden of establishing
that it was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Texas court.4 ' Further,
since no findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed, the record must
be viewed in the light most favorable to supporting the judgment.42 The
court applied the facts pursuant to these rules and sustained the trial
court's dismissal. Only by viewing the facts in a light unrealistically
favorable to the trial court's determination can the exercise of jurisdiction
in this case be said to offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. There was an operative dealership agreement in effect for the most
populous areas of Texas. Goods were sent to Texas. Money was sent to
Texas and from Texas to California. Then a dispute arose as to that deal-
ership agreement and its operation in Texas. Surely the California corpo-
ration was constitutionally amenable to suit in Texas.4 3
On the other hand, the court in Michigan General Corp. v. Mod- U-Kraf
39. Id at 607-08. The court found these contacts sufficient to sustain jurisdiction be-
cause they satisfied the three-step test set forth in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340,
342 (Tex. 1966). See note 53 infra and accompanying text. See also Docutel Corp. v. S.A.
Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979); U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d
760, 762 (Tex. 1977).
40. 582 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
41. Id. at 575; see Scott v. Scott, 554 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1977, no writ); Gathers v. Walpace Co., 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976,
writ refd n.r.e.).
42. 582 S.W.2d at 575.
43. The courts in both Computer Synergy, 583 S.W.2d at 575-76, and Motiograph, 573
S.W.2d at 607-08, applied the three-element test set forth in note 53 infra.
19801
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Homes, Inc. 44 reversed a trial court order sustaining the defendant's spe-
cial appearance. In so doing, the court did not discuss the burden of proof
in such a hearing45 or indicate whether there were findings of fact and
conclusions of law or what effect they might have. The dispute arose out
of an alleged breach of a merger agreement. Michigan General is a corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas, but with nu-
merous subsidiaries in various states. Mod-U-Kraf is a Virginia
corporation active in Virginia and West Virginia. One of the various sub-
sidiaries of the Texas corporation operates in Virginia. This wholly owned
Virginia subsidiary of the Texas corporation negotiated a merger agree-
ment with Mod-U-Kraf, the Virginia corporation. The proposed merger
was to be between the two Virginia corporations, but Michigan General,
the Texas corporation, was also a party because its stock was to replace
outstanding shares of stock of Mod-U-Kraf. Mod-U-Kraf signed the
agreement in Virginia, while Michigan General and Michigan General of
Virginia signed in Dallas.
Although the presence of the Virginia subsidiary complicated the pic-
ture, the court held that the suit arose out of a contact that had substantial
economic relationships with Texas. While operations in Virginia might
remain purely local and therefore distinct from Texas, corporate owner-
ship and control by a Texas corporation, Michigan General, was deemed
clearly a substantial economic and legal relationship.46 Furthermore,
Mod-U-Kraf was physically present in Texas on several occasions, and the
expenses incurred in preparing-the SEC registration statement, expenses
that were the basis of the suit, were incurred in Dallas.
In addition to the traditional judgment calls made in determining
whether an exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process, as exempli-
fied by the cases previously discussed, two other cases merit mention. The
first is Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Malra,4 7 involving a suit brought in the fed-
eral district court in Texas by a Texas corporation against two French cor-
porations. One of the French corporations, Informatique, was formed
from a division of the other, S.A. Matra, during the negotiation of a con-
tract with the plaintiff Texas corporation. Informatique completed the
contract and was held subject to jurisdiction in Texas in a suit arising out
of the contract. 48 The plaintiff also sought recovery against Matra, the
larger French corporation, arguing for jurisdiction on the grounds that the
44. 582 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
45. See notes 42 & 43 supra and accompanying text.
46. Compare the economic and legal relationship in this case to that in Western Desert,
Inc. v. Chase Resources Corp., 460 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Tex. 1978), in which two non-Texas
corporations, one with an office in Forth Worth, but neither licensed to do business by the
State of Texas, negotiated in Texas and elsewhere an agreement concerning exploring and
drilling for oil and gas in Egyptian territory occupied by Israel. A payment was sent to Fort
Worth. Perhaps sufficient economic and legal relationships existed here, but the court
treated the question as one merely of physical contact. Under that approach the subsequent
exercise of jurisdiction seems highly questionable.
47. 464 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
48. In addition to the breach of contract claim, the Texas corporation claimed viola-
tions of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980). 464 F. Supp. at 1214.
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smaller French corporation was Matra's alter ego.49 The court held that
the Texas corporation did not introduce sufficient evidence to substantiate
its alter ego claim.5° Consequently, the court considered the question of
whether or not unrelated contacts of the large French corporation, Matra,
were of such a nature as generally to affiliate it with Texas. 5' Two separate
problems are faced in any application of the doctrine of generally affiliat-
ing circumstances to a diversity case tried in a federal court. The first is
whether article 2031 b, as applied by Texas courts, permits such an asser-
tion of jurisdiction.12 Secondly, even if article 2031b applies, is it constitu-
tional?
The Texas Supreme Court has set forth a tripartite test for applying arti-
cle 2031 b:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purpose-
fully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
(2) the cause of action must arise from or be connected with, such act
or transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum
state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of
the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties,
the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the
respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. 3
The problem in the case at bar is that the cause of action does not arise
from, nor is it connected with, the nonresident defendant's purposeful acts
in Texas.54 The court, however, determined that the tripartite test is not
exclusive and thus turned to the question of whether jurisdiction could
constitutionally lie.5 In support of its conclusion that jurisdiction may be
asserted the court cited the United States Supreme Court case of Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 56 and two Fifth Circuit decisions, Eyerly
Aircraft Co. v. Killian57 and Jetco Electronics Industries v. Gardiner.5" The
Fifth Circuit decisions, held that the nonresidents' substantial and continu-
ous contacts with Texas, unrelated to the plaintiffs' causes of action, consti-
tuted independent bases for the assertion of jurisdiction over them. In
neither case did the defendants' contacts with Texas approach the impact
49. 446 F. Supp. at 1217-18.
50. Id at 1218. See also Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978), and Newton,
supra note 2, at 442-43, for a discussion of other corporate relationships not rising to alter
ego status.
5 1. For a good discussion of the proper analysis of general versus specifically affiliating
contacts, see Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal.3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
52. In this connection the federal court is, of course, bound to follow the rule in Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1933).
53. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977) (quoting
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966), which quotes from Tyee Constr.
Co. v. Dulien Steel Prod., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1951)).
54. The purposeful acts of Matra run from 1971 to 1976 and involve purchases of con-
tract computer equipment worth $8,303,494 in one case, $100,000 in a second case, and
$448,973 in a third. During this period Matra's representatives visited offices and physical
plants in Texas for periods of up to two months.
55. 464 F. Supp. at 1219-20.
56. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
57. 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
58. 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973).
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of Matra's contacts with Texas. It is submitted, however, that the Fifth
Circuit cases cited, and the court in Docutel, erroneously relied on Perkins.
In Perkins the defendant had its principal place of business in the forum
state, while the cause of action arose in another jurisdiction before the de-
fendant established its principal place of business as the forum state. In
that sense the Supreme Court did hold that the defendant's substantial and
continuous contacts with the forum state, unrelated to the plaintiff's cause
of action, could constitute an independent basis for the assertion of juris-
diction. The proper characterization of Perkins, however, is that it never
offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for a defend-
ant to be sued in his own backyard, no matter where the cause of action
arose. Admittedly in the case of corporate entities with major and continu-
ous financial dealings in a state, the court of that state may be tempted to
find jurisdiction. Unless the cause of action arises out of contacts with the
state, or unless a defendant is truly being sued in his own backyard, how-
ever, no jurisdiction should lie based on unrelated transactions.59
A similar mistake, in a far more difficult fact situation, arose in the case
of McBride v. Owens.6" In McBride a Texas resident brought suit in libel
against Robert Owens and Jack Cloherty, syndicated newspaper colum-
nists residing in Maryland and Virginia respectively, the Los Angeles
Times Syndicate, which sold and distributed columns written by Owens
and Cloherty to newspapers, the Orlando Sentinel Star Company of Flor-
ida, and the Denver Post of Colorado. Plaintiff alleged that a libelous arti-
cle, written by defendants Owens and Cloherty, was distributed by the
Syndicate to newspapers throughout the United States. Although the three
Texas newspapers to which the libelous article was sent did not print it,
certain foreign newspapers did. One or more copies of those foreign news-
papers were shipped into Texas for sale. The facts seemed to show that the
article on which the suit is based was never published in Texas and that
the defendants Owens and Cloherty did not at the time of the suit and had
not prior thereto engaged in any direct business activity in Texas. Answers
to interrogatories indicated that as of the end of 1977 the Syndicate had
received $850 from Texas newspapers as compensation for articles by
Owens and Cloherty and that pursuant to the syndication agreement
Owens and Cloherty had received less than half of this amount. The Syn-
dicate does maintain an office with a telephone, reporter, and researcher in
Houston.
Citing concerns for first amendment considerations along with attenu-
ated contacts, 61 the court properly dismissed the Sentinel and the Post,
62
59. See generally Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denkla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958).
60. 454 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
61. The Orlando Sentinel Star's only connection with Texas is a mailing of 20 daily
copies of its newspaper to Texas in November 1976 out of an average daily circulation of
182,727. The Denver Post's only connection with Texas is that in November 1976 it mailed
69 daily copies of its newspaper to Texas out of an average daily circulation of 254,961. The
percentage of total circulation in Texas at the time of the alleged libel amounted to .011%
daily for the Sentinel and .027% daily for the Post.
62. 454 F. Supp. at 735. The court cited three cases as justification for the dismissal on
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but sustained jurisdiction as to Owens, Cloherty, and the Syndicate.
Aside from first amendment considerations, this case raised the question
of whether attenuated contacts with a forum could nonetheless be suffi-
cient where the acts of the nonresident defendants have an intentional na-
tional thrust. The answer is clearly that a nonresident defendant whose
primary function is reaching a national audience cannot complain about
suit by a plaintiff in the forum of the plaintiffs domicile if the plaintiff was
injured there.63 The nonresident defendant clearly intends to and .does
benefit from the laws of the forum state in connection with his work. The
forum state has an interest in protecting its citizens. Traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice will permit such an exercise of jurisdic-
tion.64 If the column submitted, however, is not printed in Texas and the
only local publication is by sale of foreign newspapers, then the test must
be applied to the publication by sale of foreign newspapers only. It would
be improper, as it was in Docutel,6" to apply the Perkins concept, as set out
in Eyery 'Aircraft,66 to allow consideration of contacts not related to the
cause of action. While the case is obviously a close one, jurisdiction might
well lie even though the sale of foreign newspapers was the only connect-
ing link. In any event, jurisdiction could only be asserted on that basis.
Rule 120a Cases. When a defendant enters a special appearance pursuant
to rule 120a,67 the question arises whether an ex parte affidavit will be a
sufficient basis for a trial court jurisdiction determination. Professor Mc-
Donald in his treatise suggests that a sworn motion by the defendant
should constitute a prima facie showing of the verity of the facts stated
under oath,6 8 but in the case of Main Bank & Trust v. Nye6 9 the court held
that an ex parte affidavit is not enough to provide a jurisdictional basis.
According to the court, current Texas law requires a defendant to file a
special appearance under rule 120a to produce evidence showing lack of
amenability to jurisdiction.7" Absent statutory change or a change in the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, an ex parte affidavit ranks with hearsay on
due process grounds. See Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1975);
New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley v. New York Times
Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964); ef Anseimi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.
1977) (reversing and remanding a district court dismissal on due process grounds by dist-
inguishing Buckley).
63. See Hartmann v. Times, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838
(1948); 61 HARV. L REV. 1460 (1948).
64. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
65. Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
66. 414 F.2d at 598 n.7.
67. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
68. 2 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 9.05.3 (1970).
69. 571 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Although this
decision was reached during the prior survey period it merits discussion.
70. Id at 223-24 (citing Gathers v. Walpace Co., 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); Law, Snakard, Brown & Gambill v. Brunette, 509 S.W.2d
671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ refd n.r.e.); Roquemore v. Roquemore, 431
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the scale of evidence.7 Since "hearsay evidence is no evidence at all,"
according to the court, an ex parte affidavit will not alone support a dis-
missal on a rule 120a special appearance.
C. Contractual Forum Selection
A suit in federal court growing out of an alleged breach of two subcon-
tracts raised two interesting questions with respect to a contractual venue
selection clause. In Taylor v. Titan Midwest Construction Corp. 72 the de-
fendant sought dismissal or, in the alternative, transfer based on a contrac-
tual clause providing that "jurisdiction and venue shall be in the
appropriate court having subject matter jurisdiction over the matter sitting
within the County in which the principal offices of the Contractor are lo-
cated on the date of the dispute."73 In deciding whether to enforce this
contractual provision the court faced two questions. First, the court had to
decide whether federal law governs or whether under the Erie doctrine
state law should control. Secondly, the court had to decide whether such a
forum selection clause would be enforced under applicable law.
The court admitted that whether the Erie doctrine controlled depended
on how the issue was characterized. If the issue was phrased in terms of
contract law then Erie should apply." On the other hand, if the issue was
viewed primarily as a matter of venue then it was essentially procedural.
The court in Taylor concluded that federal law should control since the
overriding question was one of procedure (venue) and not determinative
of the ultimate outcome of the lawsuit.75 While the State of Texas has a
strong interest in where its citizens may sue or be sued within Texas courts,
the federal courts have a strong interest in where parties sue within the
federal court system. Furthermore, the court concluded, resort to state law
would "balkanize venue rules when a uniform rule is patently prefera-
ble." 76
The court then turned to the question of whether a forum selection
clause will be enforced under federal law. Here the court relied heavily on
S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ)). See also Thode, SpecialAp-
pearance, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279 (1964).
71. 571 S.W.2d at 223.
72. 474 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
73. Id at 146.
74. Id. at 147. If the applicable state law, determined under Texas conflicts law, were
Texas law, then the provision might not be given effect since contractual venue provisions
are not enforceable in state courts. See Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d
535, 537 (Tex. 1972). Decisions by other courts as to whether state or federal law ought to be
used to determine the enforceability of contractual venue provisions are split. Compare
Leasewell, Ltd. v. James Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D.W. Va. 1976), and Davis
v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 381 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1974), with St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 401 F. Supp. 927 (D. Mass. 1975), and Brown v. Gingiss Int'l,
Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Wis. 1973), all cited by the court. 474 F. Supp. at 147.
75. 474 F. Supp. at 147 (citing Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)).
76. 474 F. Supp. at 147.
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the United States Supreme Court decision upholding a forum selection
clause in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.," an admiralty case in-
volving an international agreement to tow an oil drilling rig from Louisi-
ana to Italy.78 The Supreme Court found uncertainty and inconvenience
in such an arrangement if jurisdiction were left entirely to chance. Never-
theless, the Court subjected the contractual jurisdiction clause to scrutiny
under a two-pronged test to assure equality of bargaining power and pro-
tection of public policy interests.79 Applying this test, the Taylor court
upheld the contractual venue provision. The court observed that the con-
tracting parties were of equal bargaining power and that the forum pro-
vided was reasonable in that it bore a reasonable relation to the dispute
and did not inconvenience the parties.8"
II. CHOICE OF LAW
The most important conflict of laws case of the survey period is Gutierrez
v. Collins,8 in which the Texas Supreme Court dealt with two issues: the
propriety of the dissimilarity doctrine and the proper choice of law ap-
proach in tort cases.
It is appropriate to consider first the treatment given the dissimilarity
doctrine by the Texas Supreme Court.82 In its more extreme form the dis-
similarity doctrine required courts to dismiss causes of action upon a
showing by the defendant that the law of the place of the tort was materi-
ally different from the laws of this state. Of course, until July 1979 Texas
followed the lex loci delicti rule as to torts so that when the tort law of the
place of the injury was "materially different" from Texas tort law, Texas
courts refused to entertain the suit.
This curious doctrine seems to have started with the 1887 case of Texas
& Pacic Railway v. Richards.83 In that case a minor daughter sought re-
covery in tort for injuries to her deceased father. As Texas had no survival
statute, Justice Stayton reviewed existing law and proclaimed there were
three classes of cases dealing with whether or not a right given solely by
the statutes of one state will be enforced in the courts of another: (1) cases
77. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
78. Decisions subsequent to Bremen, however, have extended its rationale to domestic
nonadmiralty cases. 474 F. Supp. at 148 (citing In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air,
Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity
Co., 401 F. Supp. 927 (D. Mass. 1975); Spatz v. Nascone, 368 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
denying motion to vacate 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa.)). The rationale in Bremen consisted of
one negative and two affirmative parts. The negative part was an explanation of the histori-
cal view holding forum selection clauses unenforceable as against public policy. This histor-
ical view was at least in part an outgrowth of the political desire to unify England. Since the
unity of the United States seems relatively assured, the historical base is gone. 407 U.S. at 9-
11. The two affirmative parts of the Bremen rationale require that the agreement be the
result of a freely and equally bargained exchange and that no strong public policy be contra-
vened by the agreement. 407 U.S. at 12-15.
79. 407 U.S. at 523-25.
80. 474 F. Supp. at 149.
81. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
82. Id. at 319-22.
83. 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887).
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where both states had similar statutes; (2) cases where the state of occur-
rence had no statute, but the forum state did; and (3) cases where the state
of occurrence had a statute creating a cause of action, but the forum state
did not. Only in the first instance might a forum state choose foreign law.
After establishing that the case at bar fell into the third category the court
concluded:
We know of no rule of law which would authorize a court of this
state to give effect to the laws of another state conferring such right as
is claimed in this case, when the laws of this state declare that the
same facts, transpiring here, as are made the basis of the appellee's
claim, could confer no right whatever to the relief sought. The most
liberal state comity cannot, in reference to such a matter as that before
us, require our state to enforce the laws of another when in conflict
with its own.84
Only against the backdrop of the pervasive doctrine of territoriality did
such a statement make sense.85 In Texas the general territorial proclivity
in exercises of jurisdiction and choice of law took a particularly unhappy
turn. In 1896 in the case of Mexican NationalRailway Co. v. Jackson86 the
Texas Supreme Court dealt with a plaintiff who pleaded, proved, and re-
covered under the law of Mexico at trial. The supreme court decided that
there was an established doctrine in Texas against adjudication of rights of
parties arising under dissimilar laws and that the laws of Mexico, as
pleaded and proved in this case, were dissimilar. The court noted that
Mexican tort law was intertwined with Mexican penal laws; Mexican law
allowed the plaintiff to recover damages measured by his social position,
required payment in installments, allowed the defendant to reduce the
amount of payment if the plaintiff recovered, allowed the plaintiff to sue
again for complications that might result from the injury after judgment
and required the trial court to encourage settlement.87 As was pointed out
in Gutierrez, soon after Jackson the dissimilarity doctrine was accepted as
a per se rule.88 This rule came to have extreme manifestations. For in-
stance in El Paso & Juarez Traction v. Carruth89 the court held that all the
defendant had to show was that the laws of Mexico remained substantially
unchanged since Jackson, and dismissal pursuant to the dissimilarity doc-
trine, automatically followed. In the oft-cited case of Carter v. Tillery9" the
court classified the dissimilarity doctrine as a jurisdictional question. In
Carter the plaintiff and defendant were both residents of Potter County,
84. Id at 378-79, 4 S.W. at 629.
85. For instance, Justice Stayton cited Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 17 (1881);
Boyce v. Wabash R.R., 63 Iowa 72, 18 N.W. 673 (1840); State v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville
R.R., 45 Md. 41 (1876); Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109 (1874); Whitford v. Panama
R.R., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861); Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., 84 N.Y. 48 (1881);
Willis v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 61 Tex. 432 (1884); Needham v. Grand Trunk R.R., 38 Vt. 292
(1865).
86. 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896).
87. Id at 113-14, 33 S.W. at 860-61.
88. 583 S.W.2d at 320.
89. 255 S.W. 159 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgmt adopted).
90. 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953, writ refd n.r.e.).
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Texas. Plaintiff was a gratuitous guest of the defendant on a trip by pri-
vate airplane that was to have gone from Artesia, New Mexico, to El Paso,
Texas, but landed off course in Chihuahua, Mexico. The plane crashed in
Mexico as it attempted to take off after the unscheduled landing. In this
case the State of Texas clearly had a compelling interest in insuring that
Texas plaintiffs had effective legal redress against Texas defendants. Since
it is likely that no effective exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant was
possible in a Mexican court, the application of the Texas dissimilarity doc-
trine had the effect of denying the plaintiff any chance of legal redress,
truly an "ultimate horror."'
Such extreme results were ameliorated in some cases, because Texas
courts recognized the potential harshness of the doctrine and sought ways
around it. For instance, it was held that in order for a suit to be dismissed
on dissimilarity grounds there had to be proof of foreign law. In the ab-
sence of such proof the courts presumed the laws of the other state to be
the same as Texas.92 In Flaiz v. Moore93 the Texas Supreme Court held
that the dissimilarity doctrine "does not present a jurisdictional question in
the sense that it might be raised for the first time on appeal."94 Thus,
failure of the defendant properly to raise the dissimilarity doctrine waived
it. Perhaps most important, courts often avoided the dissimilarity doctrine
by characterization. A "tort" became a "contract."95 A rule of substantive
law could become a procedural rule, and Texas law thus applied.96
Each ameliorating influence on the dissimilarity doctrine had its limits,
however. A tort could not be made into a contract if the elements of a
contract could not be proven.97 A plaintiff could not always count on the
defendant's failure to raise dissimilarity.98 Further, the United States
Supreme Court considerably limited the right of Texas courts to character-
ize substantive rights as procedural rights.99 Given the harsh nature of the
rule and the limited measures available to avoid the rule, it is not surpris-
ing that the Texas Supreme Court chose to reconsider it."° The dissimi-
91. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 225 (1971).
92. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Mitten, 36 S.W. 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ refd).
93. 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962).
94. Id at 875.
95. See Garza v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1967, no writ); Hudson v. Continental Bus Sys., Inc., 317 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1958, writ refd n.r.e.).
96. See Penny v. Powell, 162 Tex. 497, 347 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1961).
97. For instance intersection accidents between strangers could not be pleaded under
contract theories.
98. See Banco de Mexico v. DaCammara, 55 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1932, writ dism'd); Compania Bancaria v. Border Nat'l Bank, 265 S.W. 599 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1924, writ dism'd).
99. See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), which held that the remedial
processes for Mexican tort law were so inextricably linked with the cause of action that a
court enforcing a Mexican cause of action must also use Mexican remedial procedures.
Consequently, procedural characterization of an issue in a Mexican cause of action could
not avoid the dissimilarity doctrine. See also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
100. Commentators have uniformly and vehemently criticized the doctrine. See S. BAY-
ITCH & J. SIQUEIROS, CONFLICT OF LAWS: MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 150-54
(1968); A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (1972); G. STUMBERG, PRINCI-
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larity doctrine was grounded "on notions of practicality, fairness, and
public policy prevalent"'' in 1896. The notion of practicality had to do
with obtaining translations of Mexican statutes and judicial opinions,
which is no longer a problem today.' °2 The notion of fairness had to do
with incorrectly interpreting and applying Mexican law. Such incorrect
interpretations could result from either a paucity of available translations
or an inability on the part of the court to understand and apply foreign
law.'0 3 Having determined that adequate translations were available, it
remained only for the court to consider the ability of the judiciary to com-
prehend and apply laws of other jurisdictions. The supreme court noted
that Texas courts have comprehended and applied Mexican law,' 4 that
courts of other jurisdictions have comprehended and applied foreign
law'0 5 including Mexican law,'0 6 and that it would be rare to find other
states in the United States or "civilized" nations in the world with judicial
remedies that could not be approximated in Texas.'0 7
This leaves only the question of public policy, which the Supreme Court
of Texas noted favored the dissimilarity doctrine.' 08 Today's public policy
does not mandate retention of the doctrine.' 09 The death of the dissimilar-
ity doctrine and the invitation to eschew parochialism are indeed welcome
changes in Texas law.
Also welcome is the adoption by the supreme court of the rule of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in tort cases. This new choice of
law approach must be viewed in its historical context. Choice of law
problems arise out of private transactions involving more than one sover-
eign entity. One of the early members of the United States Supreme Court
and a faculty member at the Harvard Law School, Joseph Story, published
the first comprehensive treatment on American conflicts law. It was noth-
PLES OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS 210 (3d ed. 1963); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 91, at 225;
Paulsen, Foreign Law in Texas Courts, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 437 (1955); Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws-Torts-Texas Decisions, 9 TEXAS L. REV. 21 (1930); Comment, The Texas Dissimi-
larity Doctrine as Applied to the Tort Law of Mexico-4 Modern Evaluation, 55 TEXAS L.
REV. 1281 (1977); Note, Conflicts-Recovery in Tort or in the Alternative Breach of Contract
When Texas Law Conflicts with Mexican Law, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 379 (1968). See also
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 320 (Tex. 1979).
101. 583 S.W.2d at 320.
102. As is noted in the decision, 583 S.W.2d at 320, there must be pleading and proof of
the laws of Mexico. See also Thomas, Proof of Foreign Law in Texas, 25 Sw. L.J. 554
(1971).
103. Although not discussed by the court, this inability to understand and apply foreign
law could also involve the differences between the common law and code or civil law.
104. See 583 S.W.2d at 521 (citing Ochoa v. Evans, 498 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1973, no writ); Apodaca v. Banco Longoria, S.A., 451 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1970, writ refd n.r.e.)).
105. See cases cited in 583 S.W.2d at 321 n.8.
106. See Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (1958).
107. See 583 S.W.2d at 321 (citing R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 50 (3d ed.
1977)).
108. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text. Generally, no court will enforce
foreign laws violative of the public morals or interests of the forum state.




ing but a restatement of the territorial imperative."' Shortly thereafter an
Englishman, A.V. Dicey, proposed and popularized a "vested rights" the-
ory of conflicts law. Professor Joseph Beale of the Harvard Law School
then took up the case for vested rights and the territorial imperative, and
his views prevailed in almost all cases."' In 1934 the American Law Insti-
tute's first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, largely a product of Beale's
work, was published. It epitomized the territorial view, lex loci delicti in
torts, that had come to be accepted throughout the United States." 2 Texas
did not deviate from the majority view. 113
110. This view was originally set forth by the Dutch scholar Ulric Huber. Huber es-
poused three principles:
(1) The laws of each state have force within the limits of that government
and bind all subjects to it, but not beyond.
(2) All persons within the limits of a government, whether they live there
permanently or temporarily, are deemed to be subjects thereof.
(3) Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired within the
limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do not
cause prejudice to the power or rights of such government or of its subjects.
Quoted in E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 164 (1947).
111. For a helpful short characterization of this history, see W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 4-5 (1978).
112. Indeed, for several years after 1918 Beale's views seemed to have acquired constitu-
tional underpinnings. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376 (1918).
113. Starting in 1884 Texas courts recognized as a common law rule applicable in tort
cases the concept of lex loci delicti. Willis v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 61 Tex. 432 (1884). This
first reported Texas case dealing with a choice of law involved a suit in tort for wrongful
death. Mrs. Dora Willis sued the Missouri Pacific Railway Company to recover for the
negligent killing of her brakeman husband. The accident occurred in the Indian Territory.
There was a wrongful death statute in Texas but none in the Indian Territory. Thus, from
the outset in Texas lex loci delicti proved its capacity for causing unjust results. Other early
cases were Texas & P. Ry. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887), and St. Louis, I. M. &
S. Ry. v. McCormick, 71 Tex. 660, 9 S.W. 549 (1888). Recognition of the content of the rule
was followed by adoption of that concept by statute. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 156, at 365.
In 1922 the Texas Commission of Appeals, in discussing this statutory embodiment of the
territoriality concept in wrongful death cases, utilized the formal Latin label lex loci delictus.
Jones v. Louisiana W. Ry., 243 S.W. 976, 978 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, judgmt adopted).
The first statutory provision was passed in 1913 and provided:
That whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this State or of a
country having equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citi-
zens, has been or may be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default in any
State, for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof is given by a statute or by law of such State, territory or foreign coun-
try, such right of action may be enforced in the courts of the United States, or
in the courts of this State, within the time prescribed for the commencement of
such action by the statute of this State, and the law of the former shall control
in the maintenance of such action in all matters pertaining to procedure.
1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 161, at 338.
In 1917 a slightly different version was passed. It provided:
That whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this State or of
the United States, or of any foreign country having equal treaty rights with the
United States on behalf of its citizens, has been or may be caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of another in any such foreign state or country
for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages thereof is given
by the statute or law of such foreign state or country, such right of action may
be enforced in the courts of this State within the time prescribed for the com-
mencement of such action by the statute of this State, and the law of the forum
shall control in the prosecution and maintenance of such action in the courts
of this State in all matters pertaining to the procedure.
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By the time that Beale's first Restatement came out in 1934, there were
persistent critics of the territorial imperative in choice of law. Foremost
among these critics were Professor Ernest Lorenzen and Professor Walter
Wheeler Cook."t 4 The primary thrust of their criticism of the then domi-
nant vested rights approach was that it too often tended to ignore the de-
mands of justice in the particular situation or case.
In addition, within the federal system of the United States, the territorial
imperative as to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction was undergoing a
dramatic change. In Pennoyer v. Neff,"I5 decided by the Supreme Court in
1878, the territorial concept was all encompassing. By 1945, however, the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction was no longer tied to territoriality
alone." 6 Finally, by 1958 the Supreme Court had clearly separated the
questions of choice of law and exercise of jurisdiction as they related to
constitutional considerations.' '7
Once the monolithic hold of territoriality was broken, courts began to
adopt choice of law approaches different from the traditional lex loci
delicti rule. In 1968, the Texas Supreme Court was asked to adopt the
most significant contacts rule in lieu of the place of the tort rule.' 18 The
court refused to do so because in its view, at least in a wrongful death
case," 9 the law of the place of the tort was statutorily mandated. 12
0
1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 156, § 1, at 365 (TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon
1952)).
That language was thereafter amended in 1975. The statute now provides:
Whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this State or of the
United States, or of any foreign country having equal treaty rights with the
United States on behalf of its citizens, has been or may be caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of another in any foreign State or country for
which a right to maintain an action and recover damages thereof is given by
the statute or law of such foreign State or country, or of this State, such right
of action may be enforced in the courts of this State within the time prescribed
for the commencement of such actions by the statutes of this State. All mat-
ters pertaining to procedure in the prosecution or maintenance of such action
in the courts of this State shall be governed by the law of this State, and the
court shall apply such rules of substantive law as are appropriate under the
facts of the case.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
114. See generally E. LORENZEN, supra note 110; W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
115. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
116. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
117. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
254 (1958).
118. Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
119. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
120. This statutory mandate, however, was a rather curious one. In 1860 the first wrong-
ful death statute was passed in Texas. 1860 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 35, at 32, 4 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 1394 (1898). Statutory authorization was required since this cause of action
was unknown at common law. The Texas statute authorizing recovery for wrongful death
did not contain any mention of the territorial reach of the statute. But the Texas court,
reflecting the view of the time, held the statute did not have any extraterritorial effect. Willis
v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 61 Tex. 432 (1884). This holding was believed to be constitutionally man-
dated. See note 112 supra. Therefore, the Texas Legislature acted in 1913 to allow its citi-
zens to bring suit in Texas applying the law of the place of the injury. See note 113 supra.
In this context the permissive nature of the language used indicates that an injured party
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The dissent viewed the problem, continued adherence to the lex loci
delicti rule, as judicial in nature and would have utilized the "most signifi-
cant contacts" view of the Restatement (Second).12 1
In 1972 the supreme court was again faced with a request to change the
Texas law of lex loci delicti. 122 The court refused. Although there was no
dissent, three justices concurred in a request for legislative change.' 23 In
1975 the legislature acted. 124  Although some potential problems re-
mained, 125 it was only a matter of time before the supreme court would
utilize this legislative authorization to end the lex loci delicti era.
126
The end of the lex loci delicti era came in a somewhat unusual form. In
Gutierrez v. Collins'27 a relatively classic fact pattern was presented. 28
Gutierrez and Collins were both residents of El Paso, Texas. While in
Mexico, Gutierrez was hurt in an automobile accident and sued Collins,
alleging negligence. Collins, relying on the combined effect of the dissimi-
larity doctrine and the lex loci delicti rule, prevailed in both the district
could sue in the state of injury where the law of that forum would be applied, or the injured
party could sue in Texas, but in that case the law of the place of injury would apply. Al-
though this statutory provision was placed in the wrongful death series, it always purported
to apply to either death or personal injury cases. Id The emergency clause to the 1913 Act
asserted that there was no existing law permitting citizens of Texas who received injuries "in
a foreign country" to bring actions in Texas. The clause provided:
The fact that there is now no law permitting citizens of this State who re-
ceive injuries in a foreign country from bringing an action for said injuries
under the laws of this State, creates an emergency and imperative public ne-
cessity requiring that the constitutional rule that bills shall be read upon three
several days, should be suspended and it is hereby suspended, and this Act
shall take effect from and after its passage.
1917 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 156, § 2, at 365. This was not an accurate statement of the lex loci
delicti rule since as to injuries not resulting in death no statutory authorization was neces-
sary; under the traditional common law the forum state applied the tort law of the place of
the injury. Of course, the same argument could be made with regard to wrongful death
actions. The confusion as to wrongful death is understandable, however, since it was purely
a creature of statute.
By the time the supreme court was called on in 1968 to consider the meaning of the
appropriate statutory provisions, the idea that states had no power under the United States
Constitution to give extraterritorial effect to their laws had long since fallen. Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). It was argued that the basic Texas wrongful death statute
could simply be applied, and the authorization of use of the law of the place of the tort need
not be invoked. 430 S.W.2d at 184-85. The majority rejected this invitation to free Texas
from a statutorily imposed lex loci delicti rule. Even if previous interpretations were in error
by more current views, reasoned the majority, they were not necessarily in error at the time
initially made. And further, since the legislature could simply amend the statute if it found
the court's interpretation unacceptable, failure to adhere to stare decisis in this case would
amount to judicial amendment of a statute. Id at 183-87, 193-94.
121. 430 S.W.2d at 188-93.
122. Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 1972).
123. Id at 719-20.
124. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon Supp. 1980); note 113 supra.
125. See Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 268, 292
(1976).
126. See Newton, supra note 2, at 447.
127. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
128. Compare Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
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court and court of civil appeals.' 29 The supreme court, however, reversed,
holding that in cases involving personal injuries, instead of wrongful
death, there was no statutory mandate for the lex loci delicti rule. 3° Al-
though it was conceded that language in many decisions included personal
injuries, 13 1 the court noted (1) that its decisions had always involved
wrongful death actions, (2) that most commentators have "suggested that
Article 4678 does not mandate enforcement of the lex loci delicti rule,' 132
and (3) that federal district courts had held personal injury cases were not
statutorily controlled.' 33 The supreme court held that lex loci delicti in
personal injury cases was not statutorily mandated. 134 Consequently, the
court turned its attention to the question of whether the place of the tort
rule should continue as the choice of law rule in Texas.
Three main arguments were recognized as supporting retention of the
lex loci delicti rule. First, it was said to be a uniform, consistent, and pre-
dictable rule of law. As the court noted, however, even if the rule were
uniform, consistent, and predictable it would not be sustainable if it pro-
duced arbitrary and unjust results. Further, since courts recognized that
the rule often produced arbitrary and unjust results, various subterfuges
were employed.135 This undercut uniformity, consistency, and predictabil-
ity. Secondly, it was argued that the cure was worse than the disease; every
alternative rule or approach was so difficult to apply as to lead to "varying,
inconsistent and unpredictable results, which would serve only to confuse
the public and profession alike, as well as to burden the courts with a diffi-
cult chore."' 136 The answer to this observation is that alternative ap-
proaches are not necessarily less predictable and uniform than the
traditional rule, at least as courts adjust to and refine application of
129. Gutierrez v. Collins, 570 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978).
130. 583 S.W.2d at 313-18.
131. Id at 314 (citing Ramirez v. Autobuses Blancos Flecha Roja, S.A. de C.V., 486 F.2d
493 (5th Cir. 1973); Withers v. Stimmel, 363 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ
ref d n.r.e.); Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Grandstaffv. Mercer, 214 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ refd
n.r.e.)).
132. 583 S.W.2d at 315 (citing Weintraub, Choice of Lawfor Products Liability: The Im-
pact of the Uniform Commercial Code and Recent Developments in Conflicts Analysis, 44
TEXAs L. REV. 1429, 1441-42, 1442 n.46 (1966)). Of course the statute does not mandate lex
loci delicti in wrongful death causes of action either. See notes 113 & 118-45 supra and
accompanying text.
133. Continental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Tex.
1976); Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 327 F. Supp. 897 (S.D. Tex. 1971). Of course as the opin-
ion of the supreme court in Gutierrez makes clear, even if not statutorily mandated, lex loci
delicti was clearly the choice of law rule in Texas. Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the federal district courts should not, therefore, have used any rule
other than lex loci delicti. See also Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th
Cir.), rev'd, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). The Texas Supreme Court thus cites with approval cases
whose reasoning, if not result, is suspect.
134. Contrary language in earlier supreme court opinions and opinions of the courts of
civil appeals was therefore amended or overruled.
135. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 87-90 (3d ed. 1977).
136. 583 S.W.2d at 317.
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them,'37 and that in any event "[e]ase of administration alone is a wholly
inadequate reason for retention of an unjust rule."' 38 Thirdly, it was as-
serted that stare decisis precluded a change, an argument rejected by defin-
ing the doctrine as preventing change for the sake of change but not
preventing change where warranted. Therefore, the supreme court over-
ruled the common law choice of law rule of lex loci delicti as to personal
injury cases. 139
This decision presented the question of what rule or approach should be
used in place of lex loci delicti. 4o Most major theories were considered,' 4
and the court, agreeing with Professor Leflar,' 42 found these theories were
substantially represented in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
Section 6 and section 145 are the applicable sections. Section 6 provides:
§ 6. Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statu-
tory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice
of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of the interested states and the relative
interests of these states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, 'predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied.' 43
Section 145 lists factual matters to be considered when applying the princi-
ples of section 6 to a tort case:
§ 145. The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to
that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
137. See Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well- Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 10
(1977).
138. 583 S.W.2d at 317.
139. Id at 318.
140. See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 111, at 546.
141. Included were Professor Currie's "governmental interests" test, B. CURRIE, SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963), Von Mehren and Trautman's "func-
tional approach," A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
(1965), Cavers's "principles of preference," D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
(1965), Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" or "better law" theory, R. LEFLAR,
supra note 135, and Ehrenzweig's lex fori approach, A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 100, ch. 3.
142. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 135, § 139.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative impor-
tance with respect to the particular issue.'"
Several observations about the adoption by the Texas Supreme Court of
the Restatement (Second) seem in order. First, the court was undoubtedly
accurate in its assessment of the effect of the new approach. There have
been growing pains in implementing new approaches, but after some re-
finement and adjustment there ought not to be any difficulties appreciably
greater than those that existed under the old rule. This does not mean that
advocacy born out of an understanding of the various theories is inappro-
priate. On the contrary, since the criteria of the relevant Restatement (Sec-
ond) sections are potentially inconsistent, careful pleading, proof, and
characterization will often prove determinative. As the supreme court
pointed out in Gutierrez, it is the quality not quantity of contacts that
counts. 145 Secondly, the Restatement (Second) approach to choice of law
spotlights the role of the court. Although contested questions of fact can
still be tried to a jury, questions such as where did an act occur or where
was a party domiciled, the determination of which law ought to be chosen
will depend solely on the court's determination. The supreme court cites
decisions' 46 that hold that in certain fact situations choice of law is a ques-
tion of law. Appropriate use of rule 296' 41 to request findings of fact and
law should aid in protecting against parochialism and rationalization.
Thirdly, there is a question as to the exact reach of the holding in Gutier-
rez. In a technical sense the Restatement (Second) rule applies only to tort
cases involving injuries suffered in other jurisdictions. Causes of action in
wrongful death, or contract are not covered. 148 It seems clear, however,
144. Id § 145.
145. 583 S.W.2d at 319.
146. Id (citing Moore v. Montes, 22 Ariz. App. 562, 529 P.2d 716 (1974); Hurtado v.
Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 552 P.2d 616, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); Brickner v. Gooden,
525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974)). See also Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan. 4 Time to Go
Modern, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 829, 831-32 (1978).
147. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
148. The applicable Restatement (Second) provisions in contract are § 6, set out in the
text accompanying note 143 supra, and § 188, which provides:
§ 188. Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
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that the Restatement (Second) approach will be adopted across the board.
In a footnote the court signaled the propriety of adopting the Restatement
(Second) in wrongful death actions. 149 Surely it is an appropriate guide in
contracts as well.' 50
III. JUDGMENTS
In modern society, with increased personal mobility and increased social
acceptance of litigation, questions concerning the effect and finality of
judgments, or the amenability of judgments to direct or collateral attack
arise frequently. In most instances the cases follow established patterns,
but not always. Some of the cases illustrative of interesting variations are
briefly discussed.
A. Full Faith and Credit.: Divorce Decrees and Property Divisions
Changes in the law of property, specifically changes relating to retire-
ment benefits, create a special problem with respect to awarding full faith
and credit to property divisions made in conjunction with divorce decrees.
A final judgment providing for property division upon divorce is entitled
to the same recognition, force, and effect in a sister state as in the rendering
state. 15 1 Nevertheless, application of the doctrine of full faith and credit
requires the enforcing forum to determine what effect a judgment would
have in the rendering state. Courts do not always agree on this issue, and
the law of the rendering state may change.
The last Survey discussed the case of Gerhardt v. Welsch,' 52 in which
Gerhardt sued her former husband, Welsch, for a partition of his military
retirement benefits. 53 The divorce decree and property settlement ren-
dered by the State of Washington trial court failed to mention military
retirement benefits. The San Antonio court of appeals decided that under
Washington law spouses' unaccrued pension rights were community prop-
erty, that parties to a divorce become tenants in common of property not
disposed of in the divorce decree under Washington law, and that the
plaintiff was therefore entitled to a partition upon a proper showing of
specific ownership."' The supreme court disagreed.' 55 Although there
were decisions by Washington courts on the nature of military retirement
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as other-
wise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
149. 583 S.W.2d at 317 n.3.
150. At least one tort case has already followed the Gutierrez decision. Bravo v. Texas
Farmers Ins. Co., 584 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
151. See Dunfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
152. 568 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978), rev'd, 583 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.
1979).
153. See Newton, supra note 2, at 450-51.
154. 568 S.W.2d at 879.
155. Welsch v. Gerhardt, 583 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1979).
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benefits at the time of rendition of the original decree, they were in disa-
greement. 56 About three years after the rendition of the Washington di-
vorce decree, and after the military retirement had completely vested, the
Supreme Court of Washington decided, in the case of Payne v. Payne,'57
that military retirement benefits were community property subject to divi-
sion upon dissolution of a marriage. The question of whether Gerhardt
acquired an undivided interest in the military retirement benefits thus de-
pended upon whether Payne was given retroactive effect. Three Washing-
ton courts considered the question and held that the rule should not be
given retroactive effect.' 58 These decisions stressed that a number of prop-
erty settlements would be jeopardized by a retroactive application and that
no great injustices are done in affirming what were fair dispositions of
property at the time made.'5 9 Since current Washington law forbids the
retroactive application of a rule declaring military retirement benefits to be
community property, the Texas Supreme Court held that Gerhardt had no
cause of action. '
60
B. Full Faith and Credit- Default Judgment Cases
The finality of a default judgment sought to be enforced in Texas under
the full faith and credit clause was raised in Williams v. Washington.'6'
The State of Washington sued Ralph Williams, individually, and Ralph
Williams, Inc. in a Washington court under the Washington Consumer
Protection Act. 162 Williams did not appear, and a default judgment was
rendered providing for recovery of civil penalties and attorney's fees, and
granting an injunction. Thereafter the State of Washington sought en-
forcement of the judgment in Texas. The Dallas court of civil appeals
found that the judgment was not final and therefore was not entitled to
enforcement under full faith and credit.
163
The Texas Supreme Court considered the issue of the finality of the
judgment. 64 A question as to the finality of the judgment was raised by a
portion thereof that provided: "Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of
enabling either party to this Judgment and Decree to apply to the court at
any time for the enforcement of compliance therewith, the punishment of
violations thereof, or modification or clarification thereof."' 65  If the
156. Cases implying that the benefits were community property included Morris v. Mor-
ris, 69 Wash. 2d 506, 419 P.2d 129 (1966). Another case rejected this view. See Roach v.
Roach, 72 Wash. 2d 144, 432 P.2d 579 (1967). See generall, 50 WASH. L. REV. 506 (1975).
157. 82 Wash. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973).
158. See Myser v. Myser, 21 Wash. App. 925, 589 P.2d 277 (1979); Martin v. Martin, 20
Wash. App. 686, 581 P.2d 1085 (1978); In re Marriage of Hagy, 20 Wash. App. 642, 581 P.2d
598 (1978).
159. 583 S.W.2d at 616.
160. Id at 617.
161. 566 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978), rev'd and remanded, 584 S.W.2d 260
(Tex. 1979).
162. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86 (1978).
163. See Newton, supra note 2, at 452-53.
164. Washington v. Williams, 584 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1979).
165. Id at 261 (emphasis removed).
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quoted provision applied only to injunctive relief, then the judgment
would be a final one. If, however, it related to all relief, the judgment
would not be final.' 66 Because a final judgment rendered by a court of one
state is generally entitled to the same force and effect in the court of an-
other state as it would have in the rendering state,'67 while a decree subject
to modification in the rendering state is not automatically entitled to any
recognition, force, and effect in another state,'68 the finality or lack thereof
of the Washington decree is determinative. The Texas Supreme Court
found (1) that the Washington court's clear intent, as manifest in the open-
ing paragraph of the judgment, was to render a final decree,' 6 9 (2) that the
parties considered the judgment final, and (3) that the word "modification"
had reference only to the injunctive provisions of the decree. 170 In the
view of the supreme court, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce
compliance, punish violations, and modify or clarify. 17 ' Enforcement of
compliance and punishment of violations obviously refer to post-judgment
activities in connection with the injunction. While the third area read
alone raises doubt, in context it refers to the injunctive relief as well. "The
judgment enjoins twenty-four separate acts and it is reasonable to antici-
pate that the injunctive language could require modification or clarifica-
tion from time to time to insure carrying out the trial court's intentions." 172
Retention of this power to modify or clarify injunctive provisions did not
affect the finality of the remainder of the judgment. 173
On remand to the court of civil appeals Williams asserted other points
that had been raised but not considered.'74 The major issue concerned
whether the Washington judgment was penal in the international sense
and thus not entitled to full faith and credit. The court of civil appeals
quoted from the United States Supreme Court case of Huntington v. At-
trill175 as to when a judgment is penal and not entitled to full faith and
credit:
The question whether a statute of one state, which in some aspects
may be called penal, is a penal law, in the international sense, so that
166. Id (citing Stovall v. Banks, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 583 (1870); City of Tyler v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry., 405 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1966)); see Newton, supra note 2, at 452-53.
167. 584 S.W.2d at 261 (citing Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910)).
168. 584 S.W.2d at 261 (citing Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944)).
169. The judgment was final except as to the claims of consumers that were severed as
permitted by the Washington civil rules. See Washington v. Williams, 584 S.W.2d at 261-
62; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86 (1978).
170. 584 S.W.2d at 261-62.
171. Id at 262.
172. Id
173. Id (citing State v. Stubblefield, 36 Wash. 2d 664, 220 P.2d 305 (1950)).
174. The six arguments were: (1) that the Washington judgment is penal in nature and
not entitled to full faith and credit; (2) the enforcement of this judgment would offend Texas
public policy; (3) the judgment is unconstitutionally vague and thus void; (4) the Washing-
ton Consumer Protection Act is unconstitutional; (5) the Washington trial court erred in
awarding attorney's fees; and (6) the Texas trial court erred in refusing to allow appellants
complete discovery. Williams v. Washington, 581 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1979, no writ).
175. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
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it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon the
question whether its purpose is topunish an offense against the public
justice of the state, or toprovide aprivate remedy to a person injured
by the wrongful act.' 76
This means that only criminal or quasi-criminal statutes fall under the ex-
ception. The court of civil appeals found that the Washington Consumer
Protection Act was not criminal or quasi-criminal. '77 Thus, the judgment
was not penal in nature and was entitled to full faith and credit.
C. Full Faith and Credit- Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
During the survey period there were numerous cases involving full faith
and credit where issues of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the
rendering state, both in default and contested cases, were raised. 78 Less
common was the issue of whether the rendering state had subject matter
jurisdiction. 179 In Roath v. Uniroyal, Inc. ' the court of civil appeals dealt
with the question of subject matter jurisdiction of the rendering court. In
1963 Uniroyal obtained a default judgment in Kansas against Roath, who
was then a Kansas resident. In 1967 the judgment was revived, but it be-
came dormant in 1972. Later in 1972 the dormant judgment was revived
pursuant to Kansas statutes. In 1971 Roath moved to Texas, and in 1975
the revived judgment was used as the basis of a suit against him in Texas.
As to whether subject matter jurisdiction was properly exercised in the
Kansas revival action, the court of civil appeals held that Kansas law gov-
erns questions relating to the revival of dormant Kansas judgments.
Under decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court, suits for revival of dormant
judgments are merely continuations of the original suit and, therefore,
where the court in the original suit obtained jurisdiction over the parties,
such jurisdiction is retained in the revivor action even when a party in the
revivor suit is served by publication. 18' The court of appeals then noted
that Texas courts are in agreement with this view. 182 The court pointed
176. 581 S.W.2d at 495 (quoting 146 U.S. at 674) (emphasis by the court).
177. This conclusion rested principally on the fact that Washington courts, including the
Washington Supreme Court, have held the Act not penal by virtue of its provisions for the
imposition of civil penalties in a civil action. 581 S.W.2d at 495 (citing State v. Ralph Wil-
liams' North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233 (1973); Johnston
v. Beneficial Management Corp., 85 Wash. 2d 637, 538 P.2d 510 (1975)). As further support
the court noted that the Washington statute provides that guidance in interpretation thereof
shall be had by reference to various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.920 (1978). Relevant court decisions as to those federal
statutes have held them remedial, as opposed to penal, in nature. 581 S.W.2d at 496 (citing
United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'dinpart on other
grounds, 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 693
(2d Cir. 1966)); see FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765
(3d Cir. 1963); Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941). Finally, the court found
that the judgment itself reflected that its purpose was to protect the consumer.
178. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 135, at § 79.
179. See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874).
180. 582 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
181. Id at 188 (citing Riney v. Riney, 205 Kan. 671, 473 P.2d 77 (1970); Hartz v. Fitts, 89
Kan. 751, 132 P. 1187 (1913); Rice v. Moore, 48 Kan. 590, 30 P. 10 (1892)).
182. 582 S.W.2d at 188 (citing Sias v. Berly, 245 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
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out that in Texas a court would consider whether additional liability was
imposed upon the defendant in the revivor suit or whether the only object
was reactivation of a suspended power to issue writs of execution. Since
no additional liability was imposed in the case at bar, the revivor judgment
was held to be merely a reactivation of a suspended power.
Fortunately, discussion of the Texas rule as to revivor suits was unneces-
sary in this case, because Texas law is not a proper basis for determining
the subject matter jurisdiction of a Kansas court. In cases where the forum
state examines the subject matter jurisdiction of the rendering state, as it
may, "'83 it sits as a federal court does in a diversity case and must deter-
mine and apply the law of the forum state. If the forum state has no appli-
cable rule, then a prediction must be made. Even in that case, however,
the forum law would be only persuasive authority, and care must be taken
against parochialism.
D. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The equitable nature of the related doctrines of res judicata84 and col-
lateral estoppel' 8 5 is perhaps most obvious in cases where one of the par-
ties is a governmental entity.'8 6 In Montana v. United States'87 the United
States Supreme Court suggested that an appropriate application of collat-
eral estoppel should resolve three inquiries: (1) whether the issues
presented in the instant litigation were in substance the same as those re-
solved in the previous litigation; (2) whether controlling facts and legal
principles have changed significantly since the previous litigation; and (3)
whether other special circumstances warranted an exception to the normal
rules of preclusion. '8 8 The second and third inquiries are necessary when
either res judicata or collateral estoppel are employed against the govern-
ment as a party because of the government's functions on behalf of the
public. Two cases decided during the prior survey period illustrate appli-
cations of these unique inquiries.
United States v. Lubbock Independent School District'89 questioned the
effect of a previous court order. Suit was initially commenced in 1970 by
the United States against the Lubbock Independent School District, seek-
1950), rep'd on other grounds, 151 Tex. 176, 255 S.W.2d 505 (1953); Collin County Nat'l
Bank v. Hughes, 154 S.W. 1181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913), affid, 110 Tex. 362, 220 S.W.
767 (1920); 31 TEXAS L. REV. 73 (1952)).
183. See generally Hodges, CollateralAttacks on Judgments, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 499, 540-
41 (1963).
184. The doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of all issues connected with a cause
of action or defenses that were actually tried or with due diligence should have been tried.
See Abbott Laboratories v. Gravis, 470 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1971).
185. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation between the same parties in a
subsequent suit upon a different cause of action of essential fact issues actually litigated. See
Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1971).
186. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to governmental entities. Mon-
tana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
187. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
188. Id at 975.
189. 455 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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ing relief as to segregation in the schools. The court entered a memoran-
dum opinion ordering certain remedies. The school system implemented
the remedies ordered by the court and at all times operated in accordance
with the court's order. In the spring of 1977 the residents of the school
district voted to issue tax bonds for new construction, and, because of the
court's retention of jurisdiction under its 1970 order, the school district
applied for approval of the construction plan. The United States filed in
opposition to the proposed construction plan and also sought supplemental
relief on the grounds that the 1970 order of the court had not accomplished
full integration in the school system. Basing its argument on the doctrines
of collateral estoppel and res judicata, the school district opposed the re-
quests for supplemental relief. At the time of the court's 1970 order the
judicial remedial powers of courts in school desegration cases were rather
unclear. Since that time, however, the United States Supreme Court has
significantly clarified those powers. ' 90 Weighing the overriding public in-
terest in integration, the Court rejected application of the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel because such application would result in
manifest injustice.'91
In Sullivan v. State 92 the effect of a plea bargain in a prior suit was in
question. Michael Sullivan, Jr., the duly elected Sheriff of El Paso, Texas,
was indicted for official misconduct and suit for removal from office fol-
lowed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the presiding judge was dis-
qualified to hear the suit,' 93 and the Honorable Fred Shannon was
assigned to the case. Judge Shannon proposed that Sullivan plead guilty
to two misdemeanor counts of official misconduct but that he would "not
be removed from office by this Court, but will continue in office subject to
the will of the voters at the next election."' 194
Sheriff Sullivan thereafter entered a plea of guilty and did not appeal.
Several months later the district attorney filed a quo warranto proceeding
under a Texas statute'95 declaring that convictions for misdemeanors in-
volving official misconduct result in immediate removal from office. Upon
a determination by the district court that the statute was applicable, Sulli-
van appealed. The court of civil appeals found the statute applicable and
constitutional. It recognized that the plea bargain had not been kept and
that Sullivan was entitled to have the conviction set aside,' 96 but since Sul-
livan refused to seek such relief, any statute invoked by the conviction
must apply.
190. See 455 F. Supp. at 1225 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
191. The court noted that the Fifth Circuit had repeatedly upheld this view (citing Ellis
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 465 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1972); Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish
School Sys., 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972)).
192. 572 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
193. Sullivan v. Berliner, 568 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1978).
194. 572 S.W.2d at 780.
195. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5968 (Vernon 1962).
196. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Washington v. State, 559 S.W.2d
825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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This determination raised the question as to whether Judge Shannon's
dismissal with prejudice of the original removal suit, including its provi-
sion for Sullivan's continuance in office, is res judicata barring the quo
warranto proceeding. The court of civil appeals concluded that while the
two causes of action involved the same parties, and while the first judg-
ment was final, the facts were not the same. The court reached this conclu-
sion because in the first case Sullivan had not been convicted, while in the
second case he had. In addition, the court held that the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply when its application would contravene important
public policy interests. 197 The better reason is the second, and the court is
correct in holding that there is a strong public policy favoring immediate
removal from office of officials convicted of official misconduct. In such
cases there are clearly special circumstances warranting an exception to the
normal rules of preclusion.
197. 572 S.W.2d at 784 (citing Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal. 2d 23, 194 P.2d 1 (1948); In
re Di Carlo's Estate, 3 Cal. 2d 225, 44 P.2d 562 (1935); 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 402
(1969)).
1980]

